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I. INTRODUCTION

From an office high above New York City, a lawyer waits, keeping
a close eye on a handful of large corporations. This lawyer makes a
practice of filing lawsuits whenever the board of directors of these
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corporations increase their compensation.' These lawsuits claim that the
directors are improperly using the assets of the corporation for their own
benefit.2 Of course, the lawyer knows that the lawsuits are baseless. He
also knows that the corporation will never take him to court.3 Lawsuits
are expensive, and discovery is expensive, and the lawyer knows that it
is more economical for the corporation to settle than it is for it to take
him to court.' And the lawyer is right. The corporation does settle; for
filing a meritless complaint, the lawyer receives a $100,000 check.'
Soon, the lawyer makes a practice of this. He watches corporations
and automatically sues companies whenever the compensation of the
directors goes up, for whatever reason.6 He becomes a lawyer without
clients who has embarked on an enterprise which exploits corporations,
especially those with fluctuating stock prices.7 It is only after the lawyer
decides to sue a company with deep enough pockets, that he is forced
to prove the merits of his claim in a court of law and is finally forced
to back down.'
Senator Bennett relayed this story on the senate floor in an effort to
point out one of the many deficiencies in the area of securities
litigation.9 Each year, lawyers file nearly 300 securities class action
lawsuits."0 Often, these lawyers hire plaintiffs to appear in a variety of
lawsuits, typically plaintiffs who may own only a few shares of stock."
These "professional plaintiffs" become the lawyer's tool with which they
collect huge settlements. 2 Over 90% of these cases settle at an average
settlement cost of $8.6 million dollars. 3 In 1994, these settlements cost
1. 141 CONG. REC. S19,036 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. Since many corporations base director compensation on corporate profitability,
the director's compensation may increase without direct action by the Board. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Senator Bennett remarked that this story was, in fact, based on the experience of
his father, a retired Senator who served on several boards of directors. Id.
10. 141 CONG. REC. S17,933 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). Many
of the same lawyers, and sometimes the same plaintiffs, appear repeatedly in the lawsuits. Id.
Many times, the same "form" complaint is used over and over, and almost any change in the
company can bring on such a complaint. Id. "A drop in... stock price, a failed product
development project, or even adverse market conditions that affect earnings, can trigger...
securities fraud lawsuits." Id.

11. Id.
12. See id. at S17,933-34.
13. Id. at S17,934. One member of a company told a securities subcommittee that
responding to discovery resulted in the production of over 1500 boxes of documents. Id. at
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companies and their insurers $1.4 billion dollars.1 4 Ironically, after the
lawyer collects his fees, the class members receive only about six cents
on the dollar.15
In an effort to put a stop to frivolous complaints and to curb abusive
securities litigation, Congress enacted, over President Clinton's veto, the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.16 The Act, which was
in the making for four years before passage on December 22, 1995,"7
contains several notable reforms designed to provide lawyers a strong
disincentive to file abusive and frivolous claims." The most notable
reforms include: (1) a safe harbor provision which would prevent
companies from being sued for forward-looking statements, as long as
these statements are accompanied by meaningful cautionary language;19

S17,933. The total cost of discovery to the company was $1.4 million. Id.
14. Id. at 17,934.
15. Id. However, the "professional plaintiffs," whose names appear as lead plaintiff in
many suits "are paid well for their services, usually in the form of a bounty payment." Id.
According to news reports, one person was lead plaintiff in over 300 lawsuits. Id.
16. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); see Jeffrey Taylor, Congress Sends Business a ChristmasGift: Veto Is Overriddenon
Bill Curbing Securities Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1995, at A2 [hereinafter Taylor,
Christmas Gift]. The House voted 319 to 100 to override the veto. See Jeffrey Taylor, House
Votes to Override Veto of Securities-Suit Bill, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1995, at A3 [hereinafter
Taylor, Securities-SuitBill]. The law went into effect on December 22, 1995, when the Senate
also overrode the veto with a vote of 68 to 30. See Taylor, ChristmasGift, supra, at A2.
17. 141 CoNG. REC. S17,933, at S17,933.
18. See id. at S17,934.
19. § 102, 109 Stat. 737, 749-51. Section 102 amends the Securities Act of 1933 by
adding a new section. The new section states in relevant portion:
(c) SAFE HARBOR.(1) IN GENERAL.- Except as provided in subsection (b), in any private action
arising under this title that is based on an untrue statement of a material fact or
omission of a material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading, a
person referred to in subsection (a) shall not be liable with respect to any forwardlooking statement, whether written or oral, if and to the extent that (A) the forward-looking statement is (i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful
cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results
to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge by that person
that the statement was false or misleading; or
(ii) if made by a business entity; was(iii) made by or with the approval of an executive officer of that entity, with
actual knowledge by that officer that the statement was false or misleading.
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(2) a heightened pleading standard requiring plaintiffs to state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the requisite state of mind2 and an automatic stay of
discovery pending a motion to dismiss;21 (3) a provision providing for
enhanced Rule 11 sanctions;22 (4) elimination of joint and several
liability except in a few narrowly defined cases; 3 (5) a provision

Id. at 750.
20. § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (1995). Another addition to the Securities Act of 1933 was
§ 101, which states in relevant part:
(2) REQUIRED STATE OF MIND.-In any private action arising under this title
in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act
or omission alleged to violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
Id.
21. § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 741 (1995). Section 101 states in relevant part:
(B) STAY OF DISCOVERY.-In any private action arising under this title, all
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion
to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion to dismiss, unless the court finds
upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve
evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.
Id.
22. § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 742 (1995). Section 101 states in relevant portion:
(A) IN GENERAL.-. . . the court shall adopt a presumption that the appropriate
sanction(i) for failure of any responsive pleading or dispositive motion to comply with
any requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an award
to the opposing party of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred
as a direct result of the violation; and
(ii) for substantial failure of any complaint to comply with any requirement of
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an award to the opposing
party of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred in the action.
Id.
23. § 201, 109 Stat. 737, 758-59 (1995). Section 201 amends the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 by adding a new section. The new section states in relevant portion:
(B) PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY.(i) IN GENERAL.-.., a covered person against whom a final judgment is
entered in a private action shall be liable solely for the portion of the judgment that
corresponds to the percentage of responsibility of that covered person....
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allowing for appointment of a lead plaintiff in class action suits,24 and
(6) a provision providing for a cap on damages2'
Perhaps as notable as these reforms, however, are the two areas
which the Act did not significantly reform. The act did not fully restore
the liability of aiders and abettors in securities fraud cases but instead
restored only the ability of the SEC to file suit against aiders and
abettors who act knowingly.26 Also, the Act does not change the
current "one and three" statute of limitations, which bars claims brought
more than one year after the fraud was discovered or three years after
it occurred."

24. § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 739 (1995). Section 101 states in relevant portion:
(i) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 90 days after the date on which a notice is
published under subparagraph (A)(i), the court shall consider any motion made by
a purported class member in response to the notice, including any motion by a
class member who is not individually named as a plaintiff in the complaint or
complaints, and shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the
purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately
representing the interests of class members... in accordance with this subparagraph.

Id.
25. § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 748-49 (1995). Section 101 states in relevant part:
(e) LIMITATION ON DAMAGES.(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any private action
arising under this title in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages by
reference to the market price of a security, the award of damages to the plaintiff
shall not exceed the difference between the purchase or sale price paid or received,
as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security and the mean trading price
of that security during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the
information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the action
is disseminated to the market.
Id.
26. § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995). Another addition to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was § 104, which states in relevant part:
(f) PROSECUTION OF PERSONS WHO AID AND ABET VIOLATIONS.-For
purposes of any action brought by the Commission ... , any person that knowingly
provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this
title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, shall be deemed to be in
violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such
assistance is provided.
Id.
27. See 141 CONG. REC. S17,936 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
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Although the Act received strong bi-partisan support, those opposed
to the Act call it "a scandalous piece of legislation" which "sanctifies
the most outrageous kind of fraud and misbehavior imaginable."'
Opponents claim that the legislation goes too far in protecting companies while at the same time placing undue burdens on potential
plaintiffs.29
This Note analyzes this new piece of legislation, focusing on the
effect it will have in securities litigation. First, Part II looks at the
historical development of securities regulation, especially with respect
to securities fraud, and examines recent Supreme Court cases dealing
with securities fraud.3" Next, Part IIl focuses on some of the controversial areas of the Act and examines the arguments of both proponents and
opponents of the Act.3 Finally, Part IV questions whether the Act, now
that it has gone into effect, has functioned as expected and assesses
whether the legislation was the best solution to the problem of abusive
lawsuits.2
I.

HISTORY OF SECURITIES REGULATION

A. The Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
After the 1929 stock market crash and amidst reports of the
widespread abuses in the securities industry, the 73rd Congress enacted
the Securities Act of 19333' and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 34 The 1933 Act primarily regulates initial distributions of
securities, while the 1934 Act regulates the purchase and sale of
securities after the initial distribution.35 The purpose of these Acts is
" 'to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor... .' "" These Acts "create an extensive scheme of civil
liability," authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to "bring administrative actions and injunctive proceedings to enforce
28. 141 CONG. REC. H14,038, H14,041 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Dingell). Rep. Dingell went on to say that the legislation "would be beloved by Mike Milken,
Ivan Boesky, and Charles Keeting.... It will permit the skinning of widows and orphans." Id.
29. See id.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 33-73.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 74-143.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 144-69.
33. 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1933).
34. 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-1/ (1934).
35. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975).
36. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
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a variety of statutory prohibitions."3 Additionally, private plaintiffs
may sue under both express private rights of action and under the
implied private rights of action contained in sections 10(b) and 14(a).38
Section 10(b) is the general anti-fraud provision. 9 In 1942, the SEC
adopted a similar anti-fraud provision, Rule 10b-5. °
In cases dealing with section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the Supreme
Court has addressed two primary issues. 4 1 First, the Court has had to
determine what kinds of actions are prohibited by section 10(b).42
Second, "in cases where the defendant has committed a violation of sec.
10(b)," the Court has answered questions regarding the elements that
make up the liability scheme of Rule lOb-5.43 With respect to the

37. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1994).
38. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13, n.9 (1971)
(finding a private right of action implied in the terms of § 10(b)); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (finding a private right of action implied in the terms of § 14(a)).
39. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445. Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe....
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). Rule 10(b)-5 is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
41. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445.
42. Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
43. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 445-46 (citing Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins.
of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
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second issue, the Court has noted that such decisions are difficult
"because Congress did not [explicitly] create a private § 10(b) cause of
action" and hence did not address what elements would be necessary or
appropriate for a private liability scheme." The Court, then, has had
" 'to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue[s]
had the lOb-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934
Act.' ,41
B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Dealing with
Securities Fraud
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided several cases which
have limited the power of plaintiffs in bringing suits based on securities
fraud. In 1991, the Supreme Court heard the case of Lampf v.
Gilbertson,46 which raised issues as to the statute of limitations
applicable in private securities fraud actions.47 In that case, respondents
purchased units in a limited partnership for the purpose of receiving
federal income tax benefits. 8 In late 1982 and early 1983, after the
partnerships had failed, respondents were notified that the partnerships
were being investigated by the IRS. 49
Subsequently, the IRS disallowed the tax benefits, and in 1986 and
1987, respondents filed complaints against petitioner for misrepresentation." Respondents claimed that they discovered the alleged misrepresentations only after the IRS disallowed the tax benefits in 1985."' The
district court granted summary judgment for petitioner, holding that the
claims were governed by Oregon's two-year limitations period and that
respondents were put on notice of the fraud as early as 1982.52 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that there were
unresolved factual issues as to when respondents "discovered or should
U.S. 350 (1991); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards,
Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985)).
44. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
45. Id. (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett,508 U.S. at 294).
46. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
47. Id. at 352.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 352-53. The alleged misrepresentations included promises that investors would
receive "substantial tax benefits; that the leasing of the hardware and software packages would
generate a profit; that the software was readily marketable; and that [the] equipment appraisals
were accurate and reasonable." Id. at 353.
51. Id. at 353.
52. Id. The court found the investors were on "inquiry-notice" based on reports issued to
them that showed the financial decline of the partnership "and allegations of misconduct made
known to the general partners." Id.
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have discovered the alleged fraud... ."' Both courts agreed, however,
that the state statute of limitations should apply.'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a uniform federal statute
of limitations should apply.55 The Court noted that the statute does not
expressly provide for private causes of action and therefore contains no
statute of limitations.56 The Court concluded, however, that other
sections of the 1934 Act targeted the dangers of section 10(b).' These
other sections all contained a statute of limitations of one year after the
discovery of the fraud or three years after its occurrence.58 Thus, the
Court determined that the one-year statute of limitations combined with
the three-year statute of repose would be most appropriate to private
actions brought under section 10(b).59
The Court further limited the ability of a plaintiff to bring private
6
actions under section 10(b) in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank. 0
In this case, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building
Authority (Authority) issued bonds to finance a residential and
commercial development.61 Petitioner Central Bank was indenture
trustee for the bond issues.62 "The bonds were secured by landowner
assessment liens,... [and] [t]he bond covenants required that the land
subject to the liens be worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding
principal and interest."'63 Central Bank received an annual report from

53. Id. at 354 (citing Reitz v. Leasing Consultants Assoc., 895 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1990)).
54. Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court "implicitly rejected petitioner's argument"
that Rule lOb-5 should be governed by a federal statute of limitation. Id. Petitioner had argued
that the court should look "to the 'l-and-3' structure applicable to the express causes of action
in § 13 of the" 1933 Act and to some of the express actions of the 1934 Act. Id. at 354-55.

Respondents maintained that § 10(b) limitations should be derived from common-law fraud and
that the underlying policies of § 10(b) litigation "do not justify a departure from the traditional
practice of 'borrowing' analogous state-law statutes of limitations." Id. at 354.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 355.
See id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 360 n.7.

59. Id. at 362. In so doing, the Court rejected the argument of the Solicitor General, who
appeared on behalf of the SEC. See id. at 355. The Solicitor General agreed that a federal statute
of limitations was necessary, but argued that the Court should apply a five-year statute of repose
like that applicable in § 20A of the 1934 Act. Id. The SEC thought the five-year statute of

repose comported with " 'Congress's most recent views on the accommodation of competing
interests, provides the closet federal analogy, and promises to yield the best practical and policy
results in Rule lOb-5 litigation.' " Id. (quoting the Brief for Securities and Exchange

Commission as Amicus Curiae,at 8).
60.
61.
62.
63.

114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994).
Id. at 1443.
Id.
Id.
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the developer showing that this requirement was met." Subsequently,
Central Bank received word that the most recent report may not have
reflected declining property values and that the 160% test may not have
been met.65 The Authority and Central Bank agreed that Central Bank
would have an independent appraisal conducted to review the most
recent appraisal, but before the appraisal was complete, the Authority
defaulted on the bonds.6
Respondents First Interstate and Jack Naber sued the Authority,
among others, for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.67 Respondents also claimed that petitioner Central Bank
was " 'secondarily liable under § 10(b) for its conduct in aiding and
abetting the fraud.' ",6 The United States District for the District of
Colorado granted summary judgment for petitioners, and the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 9
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no private cause
of action for aiding and abetting under section 10(b).70 The Court
stated "that the statutory text controls the definition of conduct covered
by § 10(b)."'" The Court rejected the argument that the phrase "directly
or indirectly" imposes liability on aiders and abettors, reasoning that
"aiding and abetting liability extends beyond persons who engage, even
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
forth the

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the Appendix at 26).
First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 893, 905 (1992). The court of appeals set
elements of a cause of action for aiding and abetting under § 10(b):

"(1) a primary violation of § 10(b);
(2) recklessness by the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary
violation; and
(3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the alder and abettor."
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443 (citing Pring,969 F.2d at 898-903).
The court of appeals, in applying the above standard, "found that Central Bank was aware
of concerns about the accuracy of the 1988 appraisal" and that "Central Bank knew both that
the sale of the 1988 bonds was imminent and that purchasers were using the 1988 appraisal to
evaluate the collateral for the bonds." Id. at 1443-44. The court stated that Central Bank's
actions (and inactions) "could support a finding of extreme departure from standards of ordinary
care": thus, there was "a genuine issue of material fact regarding the recklessness element of
aiding and abetting liability." ld. (citing Pring,969 F.2d at 904). The court also found that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to the question of whether Central Bank "rendered
substantial assistance by delaying the independent review of the appraisal." Id. (citing Pring,969
F.2d at 904).
70. Id. at 1455.
71. Id.at 1447.
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indirectly," in prohibited activities.72 The Court noted "that the statute
prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or
the commission of a manipulative act," and the act of aiding and
abetting itself involves neither of those things. 3
While these recent Supreme Court decisions did limit the ability of
plaintiffs to bring private actions under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
these decisions had only limited effect. Abusive securities litigation was
still widespread. Thus, Congress gave birth to the controversial yet
comprehensive piece of legislation called the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Ill. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM AcT
OF 1995-MAJOR ISSUE AREAS

A. Statute of Limitations
One area of concern among opponents of the Act and even some
supporters is the Act's retention of the "one and three" year statute of
limitations set by the Supreme Court in the Lampf case. This standard
forces plaintiffs bringing private actions under section 10(b) to file
claims within one year after the fraud is discovered or three years after
it occurred, otherwise the claim is barred.74 During the Senate's
consideration of the bill, Senator Bryan introduced an amendment which
would have increased the applicable statute of limitations to a "two and
five" year statute of limitations.75 The final version of the Act, however, contains no such amendment and as such, holds to the standards set
by the Lampf case.76
The main arguments that critics advance is that the statute of
limitations will not allow investors adequate time to discover and pursue
securities violations.' I In 1991, then SEC chairman Richard Breeden
testified before the Banking Committee that the statute of limitations set
out in the Lampf case " 'will do undue damage to the ability of private
litigants to sue.' ," Chairman Breeden pointed out that many times, the
72. Id. The Court noted if Congress had chosen to "impose aiding and abetting
liability ....
it would have used that words 'aid' and 'abet' in the statutory text." Id. at 1448.
The Court stated that the issue is not whether it would be good public policy to impose liability
on aiders and abettors, but whether such liability is addressed by the statute. Id.
73. Id.
74. See 141 CONG. REC. S8,989, S8,990 (June 23, 1995) (statements of Sen. D'Amato and
Sen. Sarbanes).
75. Id. at S8,990.
76. 141 CoNG. REC. S17,933, at S17,936 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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facts surrounding the alleged fraud come to light years after the alleged
fraud actually occurred.79 In a speech on the Senate floor, Senator
Sarbanes noted that a provision to extend the statute of limitations and
overturn the Lampf decision appeared in the original bill introduced by
Senators Dodd and Dominici and had disappeared only after the
Banking Committee met to consider the bill."0
However, while the Act does prohibit potential plaintiffs from
bringing a private action more than one year after the discovery of three
years after the occurrence of the fraud, it does not prevent the SEC from
bringing suit on behalf of wronged investors after the private statute of
limitations has run."1 There is no statute of limitations for the SEC; the
SEC can bring an action years after the fraud is discovered. 2 Also,
proponents of the Lampf statute of limitations point out that by limiting
the statute of limitations to one year, lawyers are unable to go "shopping
around for years, looking for any possible violation to allege."83
B. Aiding and Abetting Liability
Another area that has received criticism from opponents of the act
deals with the liability of aiders and abettors. 4 After the Supreme
Court's decision in CentralBank, neither the SEC nor private investors
could pursue aiders and abettors of securities fraud." Section 104 of
the Act restores the ability of the SEC to file suit against aiders and
abettors of violations when the aiders and abettors act knowingly. 6
However, it does not restore the power of the SEC, which was available
pre-Central Bank, to pursue aiders and abettors who have behaved
recklessly toward the fraud, and it does not restore the ability of private
investors to pursue aiders and abettors in any situation. 7
However, proponents of the bill point out that neither the original
drafters nor the Supreme Court thought that liability for aiders and
abettors should be included in the Exchange Act.88 Furthermore, as
proponents note. investors who are faced with fraud on the part of a

79. Id.
80. Id. Senator Sarbanes noted that the FDIC, state securities regulators, and the SEC were
all in favor of overturning the Lampf decision. Id. Additionally, Sen. Sarbanes pointed out that
the Banking Committee had actually approved to the provision before it was dropped. Id.
81. 141 CONG. REC. S8,989, at S8,989 (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 141 CONG. REC. S17,933, at S17,937 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
85. Central Bank, 114 S.Ct. at 1448; see supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
87. 141 CONG. REc. S17,933, at S17,937.
88. 141 CONG. REC. H14,039, at H14,040 (statement of Rep. Bliley).
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lawyer, broker, or other person who might fall into such a category, can
always seek to bring their cause of action through the SEC. 9
C. Safe HarborProvision
Perhaps the most striking reform accomplished by the Act is the
inclusion of a safe harbor provision for forward-looking statements. The
safe harbor provision prevents companies from being sued for forwardlooking statements as long as the companies include "meaningful
cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement."' ° If the company fails to include such cautionary language,
the company can be liable for a false forward-looking statement if the
plaintiff proves that the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity
of the forward-looking statement.91 The safe harbor does not cover
IPO's, financial statement information, penny stocks, or limited
partnerships, all areas where there is a "potential for abuse."''
The purpose behind the safe harbor provision is to allow companies
to make projections about their future and to encourage disclosure
without fear that they will be sued if the predictions do not come to
fruition.93 Speaking in favor of the safe harbor provision, Senator
Dominici stated:
It is neither a license to lie, nor a license to steal. It is an
opportunity to disclose for the company and restores the
investors['] right-to-know. The bill does recognize that a
projection about the future is a prediction, not a promise, or
an adequate basis upon which to bring a multimillion dollar
lawsuit. The bill does take away the class action lawyers'
license to extort a settlement when a prediction about the
future doesn't quite materialize. 94
However, opponents of the Act claim that the safe harbor provision
does, in fact, give companies a license to lie.95 They point out that the
bill allows companies to couch phony earnings forecasts in the form of

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

141 CONG. REc. S8,989, at S8,989 (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995).
141 CONG. REc. S17,933, at S17,934 (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
See 141 CONG. REC. S12,201, S 12,204 (Aug. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici).

94. Id.
95. Frank Lalli, Now Only Clinton Can Stop Congress from Hurting Small Investors Like
You, MoNEY, Dec. 1995, at 9.
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a forward-looking statement by using "boiler-plate language," knowing
how difficult it will be for a plaintiff to prove that the company knew
the statement was false at the time they issued it.96 Opponents fear that
rather than encouraging disclosure, the safe harbor will actually
encourage companies to mislead potential investors.97 Opponents point
out that it will be difficult for investors to rely on such statements in
making their investment decisions and will discourage some from
investing at all.9"
Another potential problem with the safe harbor provision is the
difficulty in determining what constitutes "meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results
to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement."' The
Act does not elaborate on how a company should identify which factors
are more important than others or how a company should identify
forward-looking statements." °° A professor at Columbia Law School
noted that "the wording is ripe for debate."'' 1 The wording of the Act
does not explain whether the company can list some factors that will
affect future earnings while omitting other, possibly more important
factors, or whether someone who intentionally omits an important factor
would still be covered by the safe harbor."° A recent article from the
Wall Street Journalposed this very question:
Take the case of a pharmaceutical company that learns in
testing that a blockbuster drug which it has touted to
analysts doesn't work. If it says that the drug has the
potential to achieve billions a year in ales but that actual
earnings may be reduced by competition and other market
factors, is it entitled to the benefit of the safe harbor, even
though it knowingly omitted the most important factor? 3
Proponents of the Act note that the joint conference committee
intentionally chose not to include "language that would have required

96. Id.
97. 141 CoNG. REC. S19,146, S19,148 (Dec. 22, 1995) (citing letter from the National
League of Cities, National Association of Counties, National Association of County Treasurers
and Finance Offices, U.S. Conferences of Mayors, Government Finance Officers Association,
and Municipal Treasurers' Association dated Dec. 21, 1995).
98. See id.
99. 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995).
100. Margaret A. Jacobs & Edward Felsenthal, SecuritiesBill May PromptNew Litigation,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1995, at B2.
101. Id. (citing statements by John C. Coffee, Jr.).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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companies to identify the factors most likely to affect future earnings."'"' Instead, the joint conference committee created a legislative
history which will aid courts in interpreting the provision. 5
D. Pleading Standard
Another controversial area of the Act involves the pleading standard.
Section 101(b) requires the plaintiff to "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind."'' 6 Additionally, there is an automatic stay of
discovery pending the motion to dismiss, so the plaintiff will not have
the benefit of discovery to aid in determining what facts give rise to the
required state of mind." The stated purpose behind the heightened
pleading standard is to ensure that plaintiffs have a basis for their claim
before it proceeds."'° Proponents note that prior to the Act, companies,
particularly high-technology and bio-technology companies, often faced
frivolous claims of fraud "days or even hours after adverse earnings
announcements."'" For example, Raytheon Co., a large, high-tech
firm, made a tender offer of $64 per share for E-Systems, Inc." ° This
amount was "a 41 percent premium over the closing market price.' ' .
The proposed transaction was viewed as fair to E-Systems shareholders,
yet the first of eight class action suits was filed on the same day the
transaction was announced, less than 90 minutes after the courthouse
opened."'
Under the pleading standard set out in the Act, however, " '[y]ou
aren't going to see a stock price drop and five hours later have classaction cases filed in New York and San Diego.' ," The automatic
stay of discovery prevents plaintiffs' lawyers from conducting a "legal
fishing expedition" though the defendant's files and keeps defendants
from settling meritless claims simply because they wish to avoid the
often high costs of discovery."' Proponents state that the language was
meant to codify the Second Circuit standard in part."5 The main

104. Id.
105. Id.

106. 109 Stat. 737, 747 (1995).
107. Id.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

141 CONG. REC. S19,146, at S19,149 (statement of Sen. Bradley).
141 CONG. REC. S9,320, at S9,321 (statement of Sen. Dodd).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Taylor, Christmas Gift, supra note 16, at A2 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr.).

114. 141 CONG. REC. S19,146, at S19,149.
115. Id.
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difference is the substitution of the words "state with particularity" for
the words "specifically allege."" 6
However, opponents strongly urge that the pleading standard will
prevent many victims of securities fraud from accessing federal courts
and will "effectively discriminat[e] against millions of Americans who
entrust their earnings to the securities markets."' 1 7 Opponents point out
that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already provides
adequate safeguards against frivolous fraud claims, and the Act takes
things too far by requiring facts relating to state of mind to be pleaded
with particularity."' Further, opponents argue that the heightened
pleading standard infringes on "notions of privilege and confidence by
demanding that allegations on information and belief must be accompanied by 119
a particularization of 'all facts on which that belief is
formed.""

E. Enhanced Rule 11 Sanctions
The Reform Act also seeks to curb frivolous lawsuits by providing
for heightened Rule 11 sanctions. Originally, the bill as passed by the
Senate required the court to include findings in securities class actions
as to the parties' and attorneys' compliance with Rule 11. " The court
was required to impose sanctions if a plaintiff or defendant violated
Rule 11.
The presumptive sanction was "an award of reasonable
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the
violation."'' However, the law as passed goes one step further in
deterring plaintiffs from filing frivolous lawsuits. Under the law as
passed, if a plaintiff substantially violates Rule 11, the plaintiff "pays all
attorneys' fees incurred in the action" rather that "just those resulting
from the violation."' 23
F. ProportionateLiability
Section 201 of the Act eliminates joint and several liability except
when "the trier of fact specifically determines that such covered person

116. Id.
117. Id. at SI9,148 (citing a letter from Professor Arthur Miller of Harvard Law School
dated Dec. 19, 1995).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 141 CONG. REC. S17,933, at S17,937 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws."'' Previously,
a plaintiff could recover the entire judgment from one defendant, but
under the Act, each defendant will only be liable for its own share of
the damages." z The purpose behind the elimination of joint and
several liability was to prevent defendants from being liable for the total
loss even though they may have been only one or two percent at
fault." Additionally, it prevents plaintiffs from suing a defendant that
may only be marginally at fault simply because the defendant has "deep
pocket[s]."'" I Proponents of the proportional liability scheme point out
that in the past, companies have chosen to settle in cases where they
knew "they have not committed any tortious acts, but the risk of the
jury finding any evidence in the way of negligence, even a small,
minute amount, might jeopardize the company with hugh claims[.]"'"
Furthermore, these settlements rarely increase the amount of recovery
by plaintiffs, but instead merely add to the fees collected by attorneys. 29 Had the proportionate liability scheme been in force during the
savings and loan crisis, it would have saved the "Big Six" accounting
firms a substantial portion of the more than $1.6 billion dollars in
damages and settlements."
Proponents also point out that the Act retains joint and several
liability in cases where the company knowingly or intentionally defrauds
the investor."' Furthermore, the Act creates an exception for plaintiffs
whose net worth is less than $200,000 and who have recoverable
damages equal to more than 10% of their net worth." If a plaintiff
who does not meet the criteria cannot collect from one or more
defendants, the other defendants will be liable for as much as 150% of
their proportionate share.'
Opponents point out that the proportionate scheme may be unworkable and may in'fact disfavor older AmericansM because the provision
specifies that personal residences be included in determining net
worth.' This provision may disfavor older Americans who have paid

124. 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995); see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
125. 141 CONG. REC. S19,146, at S19,149.
126. 141 CONG. REC. S17,933, at S17,934 (statement of Sen. D'Amato).

127. Id.
128. Id. at S17,936.
129. 141 CONG. REC. S9,320, at S9,321 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
130. Taylor, Christmas Gift, supra note 16, at A2.
131. 141 CoNG. REC. S9,320, at S9,322.

132. 109 Stat. 737, 759-60 (1995).
133. Id. at 760.
134. 141 CONG. REC. S19,146, at S19,149.
135. 109 Stat. 737, 760 (1995).
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for their homes but have relatively low annual incomes." 6 Opponents
of the proportionate liability scheme note that these older americans will
often fail to qualify under this provision, even though they are often the
group most "devastated by fraud" because they live on fixed incomes
and proceeds from their investments.'37 Opponents also note that in the
past, the rationale behind the scheme of joint and several liability has
been that "a fraud cannot succeed without the assistance of each
'
participant, so each wrongdoer is held equally liable."138
G. Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Cap on Damages
Another problem that the Act seeks to remedy is the "hired plaintiff'
situation in which a plaintiff who owns a relatively small amount of
stock in several companies appears as lead plaintiff in a number of class
action suits all filed by the same attorney. Under the new provisions in
the Act, investors have the power to allow a plaintiff with the largest
claim to be the lead plaintiff; the lead plaintiff is then allowed to select
counsel.'39 Proponents assert that this insures that the plaintiffs with
the most at stake are adequately represented." Moreover, the Act
contains a provision which limits the number of class action suits in
which any one plaintiff can be named as lead plaintiff during a threeyear period.' The Act also requires that investors are sent notices of
settlement agreements which disclose how much investors are getting or
giving up by settling and how much their lawyers are receiving. 42
Furthermore, the Act places a cap on the award of attorneys' fees based
on how much is recovered by the investors.'43
IV. EARLY IMPACTS OF THE ACT-DOES IT
WORK AS PROMISED?

While proponents of the Act praise it as the answer to abusive
securities litigation, opponents cite the Act as scandalous legislation
which essentially gives companies a "license to lie." In reality, however,
perhaps both sides are overestimating the impact of this legislation,
whether that impact be positive or negative. As securities fraud cases are
brought under the Act, proponents may be disappointed to find that the

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

141 CONG. REC. S19,146, at S19,149.
Id.
141 CONG. REc. S17,933, at S17,938 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
109 Stat. 737, 739-40; see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
141 CONG. REC. S17,933, at S17,934 (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
109 Stat. 737, 740 (1995).
Id. at 740-41.
Id. at 740.
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legislation may not, in fact, result in substantial reduction in litigation.
Additionally, opponents of the Act may be surprised to find out that the
most controversial and "scandalous" portions of the law are merely
codifications of already existing law and may not be applied any
differently than the law prior to the Act.
For example, the heightened pleading standard that requires plaintiffs
to allege facts giving rise to a "strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind" is merely a codification of the pleading
standard adopted by the Second Circuit in In re Time Warner Inc.
Securities Litigation. " This standard already "requires plaintiffs to
plead a motive and opportunity for fraud or a strong inference of
fraudulent conduct" to survive amotion to dismiss.145 Yet, as commentators point out, generalized "complaints that allege defendants
recklessly disregarded indications of fraud survive motions to dismiss."' Thus, there is no reason to think that cases would be treated
any differently under the new law, especially when judges feel that the
plaintiff's lawyer has done a good job.
Furthermore, as one commentator points out, plaintiffs may resort to
creative pleading; since "all facts alleged in a complaint are assumed to
be true for purposes of a motion to dismiss," it would be difficult to
obtain dismissal. 47 Perhaps the more effective solution would simply
be more " 'active case management by district court judges.' ""
These judges have the ability to test plaintiffs' cases prior to trial and
also can control discovery. 49
As to the safe harbor provision for forward-looking statements, it is
essentially a codification of the "be-speaks caution" doctrine, which
" 'holds that economic projections, estimates of future performance, and
similar optimistic statements in a prospectus are not actionable when
precise cautionary language elsewhere in the document adequately
discloses the risks involved.' ", Nearly every court of appeals that

144. 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Legislative
Proposalsto Reform Securities Laws, 213 N.Y. W. 5 (May 18, 1995).
145. Block & Hoff, supra note 144, at 5; see Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268.

146. Block & Hoff, supra note 144, at 5 (citations omitted).
147. Id.
148. Dennis J. Block et al., Selected Developments Concerningthe FederalSecuritiesLaws
and in the Market for CorporateControl (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 34-7086, 1995), availablein WL 907 PLI/Corp *277, *290 (quoting In re Glenfed Inc. Sec.
Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J., concurring)).

149. Id.
150. Id. at *303.
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has considered this issue has adopted the "bespeaks caution" doctrine151
Proponents of the Act praise the safe harbor provision because they
assert that it will encourage companies to provide greater disclosure
about projections in the form of annual reports or Form K's;" however, before the Act was passed, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine was
already "widely applied," and companies were still reluctant to make
future projections. 53 Thus, the safe-harbor provision may not provide
any greater incentive for companies to make public forecasts about their
futures. At the same time, it seems odd that opponents criticize the
provision as giving companies a "license to lie," when in reality, the
protections afforded under the Act are essentially no greater than those
widely applied under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.
Another reason why the safe-harbor provision may not have as
dramatic an effect as proponents had hoped is that if a company moves
to dismiss on the ground that its allegedly fraudulent statement is
covered by the safe-harbor and the court denies that motion, the
company may lose the opportunity to argue at trial that the safe harbor
applies." 5 Thus, for the safe harbor "to have its intended effect, one
must assume that courts will be inclined to aggressively dismiss
complaints, which some may argue is contrary to experience." '5 5
With respect to the "lead plaintiff' provision, authorities predict that
institutions and large investors will not "be running to court to become
lead plaintiffs."' 56 Under the old law, institutions could file suit but
often chose not to because filing a complaint would "open ... investment practices to discovery and require that the funds attack the very
outlets1 57that offer them the first crack at the best initial public offerings."
Authorities note that under the Act, the "higher pleading standard and
risk of sanctions after dismissal" merely "magnify those worries. '
As noted earlier, the provisions dealing with the statute of limitations
and aiding and abetting liability are merely codifications of Lampf 9
and Central Bank,'6° respectively. The Act does restore the ability of

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at *307.
Id. at *305.
Id.
Id.
Karen Donovan, A Place in the Sun, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at A1, A26.
Id. (citing William S. Lerach of Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach).
Id. (citing Mr. Lerach).
See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
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the SEC to file suit against aiders and abettors who act knowingly,'
but the SEC cannot file suit against aiders and abettors who act
recklessly, and private investors cannot pursue aiders and abettors under
any circumstances." The limited restoration of power in the SEC,
however, hardly overcomes the difficulties present in reaching aiders
and abettors in securities fraud cases. The knowledge standard will be
difficult to prove, and since actions against aiders and abettors can only
be brought by the SEC, private investors are forced to bring their action
through the SEC, and they may not exercise that option. Thus, the
limited restoration of power in the SEC may exist in theory but will
most likely make no difference in practice.
Similarly, the proportionate liability scheme set up by the Act may
not be meaningful. Scienter is a required element of an action brought
under section 10(b). Prior to the enactment of the Act, federal courts had
held that the scienter requirement can be met through a showing of
"recklessness."'" However, the Act does not codify this standard and
therefore leaves open the question of how the scienter requirement is
satisfied."6 If courts determine that the requisite scienter standard in
securities fraud cases is actual knowledge, the proportionate liability
scheme will be meaningless, for the Act retains joint and several
liability for defendants who have acted knowingly.165
The Act does institute changes in the presumptive sanctions for
plaintiffs who have violated Rule 11,'" but the judge retains a large
amount of discretion in determining whether a violation has occurred.
Judges will be aware of the heightened sanctions and therefore may be
less likely to impose such sanctions on sympathetic plaintiffs. Also,
commentators note that while the heightened sanctions will force
plaintiffs' lawyers to " 'think and investigate and take Rule 11
seriously[,] ... careful plaintiffs' law firms have done that anyway .... , s9167 Thus, the heightened sanctions may not change the
practice of many plaintiffs' lawyers.
Ironically, one of the first cases decided under the new law, a case
involving a proxy contest between a corporation and a group of
shareholder activists, demonstrates how the Act may not always achieve
.161. 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995).
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Block & Hoff, supra note 144, at 5.
Id.
Id.

166. See 141 CoNG. REc. S17,933, at S17,937 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
167. LitigationReform: Industry Hails Veto Override, Consumer Groups, Others Opposed,
S.R.L.R., Jan. 5, 1996, at 5 (quoting John Olson of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher in Washington,

D.C.).
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its desired effects.'" In that case, the corporation sued to enjoin the
activists, charging them with fraud."6 The activists moved to dismiss,
and the magistrate denied the corporation's motion for expedited
discovery based on the activists' claim that the Act provides for a stay
of discovery in private actions alleging securities fraud. 7 ' The irony
of this situation is that Congress intended the stay of discovery provision
to protect corporations from "fishing expeditions" by investors seeking
to prove fraud. Thus, the company that was supposed to benefit from the
provision instead got stung.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act has been four years in
the making. Finally, on December 22, the Act became law in what was
President Clinton's first veto override. It is clear that Congress felt that
this legislation was the answer to the widespread growth of abusive
securities litigation. It is equally clear that this Act would continue to be
a source of controversy. The Act now has been in force for slightly over
two months, and it is still difficult to measure what effect, if any, the
new law has had in curbing abusive lawsuits. While proponents claim
that frivolous lawsuits are at an end, opponents claim that investors no
longer have realistic remedies for fraud. Most of the provisions in the
Act, however, are merely codifications of already existing law. Thus,
there is a question as to whether this legislation really will impact
securities litigation as much as proponents and opponents claim. Perhaps
the answer lies not in the Act, but instead in the courts. Courts may
interpret the law as providing for few significant changes. The courts
have the ability to manage their case load and to determine which suits
are meritless. The Act may have no effect at all if the courts choose to
loosely interpret its language. In the coming months, both proponents
and opponents of the bill should not be surprised to find that very few
things have changed.

168. Donovan, supra, note 156, at A26.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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